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North America 
JENNIFER D. KEENE 
The war in Europe had an immediate and direct impact on North America. 
The United States and Canada acted on their strong cultural, economic and 
political ties to Britain by contributing men, money and material to the 
Allied side. Mexico, long the site of economic competition between the 
United States, Britain and Germany, found itself at the centre of diplomatic 
intrigues which climaxed with the Zimmermann Telegram. Relations with 
Europe, however, only tell one side of the North American story. Within 
North America, populations shifted northwards to compensate for labour 
shortages once the war curtailed European immigration. To meet the Allies' 
escalating demands for industrial and agricultural products, Canada openly 
recruited US-based farm and factory workers, promising high wages and 
cheap transport until the US entry into the war dried up this labour stream. 
US labour agents turned southwards as well, fuelling the movement 
of southern workers to northern industrial centres with similar enticements. 
The 500,000 African Americans who joined this migratory wave (known 
as the Great Migration) set in motion a political and cultural reordering that 
transformed the racial landscape within the United States. Hundreds 
of thousands of Mexicans also migrated to the United States, mostly to 
escape the political and economic turmoil caused by the ongoing Mexican 
Revolution. 
These demographic shifts are just one example of how considering North 
America as an entity during the First World War offers the alluring possibility 
of breaking away from the strictures of the normal nation-state approach to 
studying the war, presenting an opportunity to consider the war's regional 
and global dimensions. Uncovering the full scope of 'North America's War' 
requires evaluating Britain's dominant position in the global political econ-
omy, North America's contribution to the fighting, international relations 
within North America and how North American-based events and initiatives 
affected the course of the war and the peace. 
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Great Britain in America 
Britain's stature as the world's largest imperial power, centre of the financial 
world and dominant naval force, meant that its entry into the war affected 
nearly every nation in some way. Indeed the cultural, political and economic 
ties that bound the United States and Canada to Great Britain distinctly 
shaped the war experience of these two North American nations. As citizens 
of a self-governing Dominion within the British Empire, 'Canadians had no 
choice about their involvement in the war, but they did have a voice when it 
came to deciding on the extent of their participation', notes David 
MacKenzie. 1 The United States declared itself a neutral nation in 1914, but 
its financial and political elite offered aid to Britain that affected the course 
of American neutrality almost immediately. Taking advantage of these 
bonds, Britain moved quickly to facilitate economic mobilisation in 
Canada and the United States by establishing a robust munitions industry 
where none had previously existed. managing a coordinated network 
that secured contracts, purchased machinery, inspected factories and trans-
ported goods overseas, Britain successfully funnelled North American 
resources towards its own shores and away from Germany. 
The strong US-British trading and financial wartime relationship evolved 
naturally from pre-existing bonds. 'Britain was by far America's largest pre-
war trading partner', Robert H. Zieger points out. 2 Less than six months after 
the war began, the House of Morgan, the financial powerhouse run by the 
]. P. Morgan bank, signed on as the purchasing and contracting agent for 
the British government within the United States. Over the next two years, the 
House of Morgan worked closely with British officials to award more than 
4,000 contracts worth over $3 billion to American businesses.3 Between 1915 
and 1917 US exports doubled, with 65 per cent going to Great Britain. 4 In 1916 
the British Foreign Office evaluated Britain's depend~ncy on the United 
States, reaching the alarming conclusion that for 'foodstuffs, for military 
necessities and for raw materials for industry, the United States was "an 
l David MacKenzie, 'Introduction: myth, memory, and the transformation of Canadian 
soci.ety', in Mac~enzie (ed.), Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honour of Robert 
Craig Brown (Umversity of Toronto Press, 2005), p. 3. 
2 Robert H. Zieger, America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience (Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 12. 
3 Ibid., pp. 30-I. 
4 Paul A. C. Koistinen, Mobilizing for Modern War: The Political Economy of American 
W mfare, 1865-1919 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1997), p. l2I. 
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absolutely irreplaceable source of supply"' .5 This booming trade in rifles, 
gunpowder, shells and machine guns also benefited the American economy 
pulling it out of recession, and created the industrial infrastructure that 
would eventually support the US war effort. 6 
The Anglophile House of Morgan aided the British cause even further by 
lending the British government enormous sums and putting pressure on other 
American banks to deny loans to Germany.7 The money flowing from 
American coffers to the British bolstered the entire Allied side, as the British 
in turn loaned money to other Entente nations like France and Russia, that 
could not secure American loans on their own. The $250 million per month 
that Britain spent in the United States by 1916 (mostly to bolster the sterling-
dollar exchange rate to keep commodity prices in check), 'reflected a depend-
ence on American industry and on the American stock market which in 
German minds both justified the submarine campaign and undermined the 
United States' claim to be neutral', writes Hew Strachan. 8 
In November 1916, this flow of US credit suddenly appeared in jeopardy 
of drying up. The Federal Reserve Board warned the House of Morgan to 
refrain from making unsecured loans to Britain, which by this point had 
nearly extinguished the gold reserves and securities used as collateral for 
US loans. 'Lack of credit was about to crimp and possibly cut off the Allies' 
stream of munitions and foodstuffs', John Milton Cooper, Jr. contends, 
scenario only averted by America's April 1917 entry into the war. 9 Hew 
Strachan remains more sceptical about any potential rupture in this financial 
partnership. Cutting off war-related trade with Britain would have sent the 
American economy into a recessionary tailspin, he argues. Strachan goes so 
far as to suggest that in the long run, continued US neutrality might have 
5 Kathleen Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 1914-1918 (Boston, MA: Allen & 
Unwin, 1985), p. 8I. 
6 Both the United States and Canada expanded agricultural production to meet Allied 
demand_. L?w-interes~ loans encouraged farmers to increase their production through 
mechamsation or buymg more land. The high prices negotiated for overseas wheat and 
cotton sales made the increased debt seem negligible, but in the 1920s declining crop prices 
depressed the American and Canadian farming industry. These 'sick' economic sectors 
intensified the severity of the economic depression that swept the world in 1929, revealing 
how long North America suffered the aftershocks of the global economic mobilisation 
during the First World War. 
7 After the United States entered the war, the government took over financing the Allies and 
lent them nearly $n billion during the period of active fighting and reconstruction. 'Less 
than $1 billion of the money lent by the American government was ever repaid, but all of the 
approximately $3 billion owed to private U.S. investors was', writes Paul A. C. Koistinen, 
Mobilizingfor Modern War, p. 135· 
8 Hew Strachan, The First World War (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 228. 
9 John Milton Cooper, Jr., Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (New York: Knopf, 2009), p. 373. 
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benefited the Allied side more than American belligerency, since its 'financial 
commitment to the Entente' had already 'bound the United States to its 
survival and even victory'. ro As a belligerent the United States now competed 
with Britain for American-produced munitions and foodstuffs to supply its 
own army. 
Great Britain also called upon Canada to produce iron, steel, artillery shells 
and chemical weapons. Jn r9r4 Canada boasted only one munitions factory. 
Over the course of the war, a British-run Imperial Mwtitions Board (JMB) 
oversaw the creation of nearly 600 factories to produce shells, fuses, propell-
ants and casings. 'Close to a third of the shells fired by the British army in 1917 
were Canadian-made', notes Desmond Morton.rr Booming Canadian textile, 
farming and lumbering industries helped pull the Canadian economy out of a 
pre-war recession, profits that Canadians used to purchase the domestic war 
loans floated by the Canadian government. Unlike Britain, Canada did not 
require massive loans from the United States to finance its war effort. Britain's 
desire to spend American loans in Canada, to the benefit of the Canadian 
economy, required a demonstration of reciprocity. In 1917, for instance, 
Britain only secured approval for using US-government loans for Canadian 
wheat purchases by promising to send at least half of it to American flour mills 
for processing. 12 
The cultural ties between the United States, Canada and Great Britain were 
very much in evidence throughout the war. Within the United States, Great 
Britain unleashed a ferocious propaganda campaign which emphasised 
German atrocities in Belgium and the loss of civilian life during Germany's 
forays into unconditional submarine warfare. British blockade practices 
arguably killed more civilians than Germany's unconditional submarine war-
fare, but German propaganda never found an equally compelling way to 
arouse American ire. 
13 
The Germans increasingly gained a reputation as the 
enemies of civilised mores. A good case in point was the overwhelming 
success that Britain had framing how Americans viewed the Lusitania sinking. 
ro Hew Strachan, The First World War, vol. I: To Anns (Oxford University Press, 2001), p.99r. 
n Desmond Morton, Marching to Armageddon: Canadians and the Great War, 1914-1919 (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989), p. 82. 
12 Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 1914-1918, pp. 172-4. 
13 Alan Kramer estimates that 478,500-700,000 German civilians (depending on the source) 
died from blockade-related starvation and disease as compared to 14,722 British mer-
chant seamen. Alan Kramer, 'Combatants and noncombatants: atrocities, massacres, 
and war crimes', in John Horne (ed.), A Companion to World War I (Oxford: Blackwell, 2012), pp. 195-6. 
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b fi d a torpedo into the Lusitania, a British M a German U- oat re . k 
On 7 ay r915 1 . d carrying munitions. The ship san h . h G many c aime was 
1 passenger s ip t at er h 8 . tims included 128 Americans. 4 h ty inutes and t e 1,19 v1c 
in less t an twen m ' . had warned Americans to stay d h ffi · 1 newspaper notices 
Germany note t at o Ga b t British propaganda successfully presen-
off ships headed to the war zone, u , . humanity US-based British 
h Ple of Germany s m · ted the attack as anot er exam . · hich they claimed, 
h d of commemorative coms, w , 
agents distributed t ousan s .c d I reality a private German 
ment had manu1acture · n 
the German govern . h' h h d a skeleton representing Death, 
. d h om w 1c s owe ' . 
citizen had create t e c ' . b all' to satirise the Alhed h t' on 'Business a ove , 
selling tickets above t e. c~~ 1 . , hile conducting a profitable arms trade. 
willingness to endanger Clv1han lives w a mistake that the British 
. tamped 5 May, not 7 
The original coms were s editated murder in the propaganda 
seized upon to accuse Germany of prem . 
· d the coin duplicates. 
pamphlet that accompame 1 1 . to Great Britain even as it h d Canada's cu tura ties ' 
The war strengt ene . th urse of the war Canada began d · t' al1sm Over e co 
gave rise to Cana ian na wn . '. h 1 then at least as a British North 
. If "f longer as a Bnt1s co ony, h 
to see itse ' 1 no . r5 E i· h-Canadians openly called t em-
. ' tes Paul Litt ng is h 
American nat10n' no . . . h . C adian nationality, but rat er 
. . h d ny or d1sm1ss t eir an 
selves Bntis , not to e .. h l'b l democracy membership in the h . thusiasm for Bnt1s I era ' 1 k 
to express t eir en 1 d' . Canadians used phrases i e d B 't' h cultura tra ltlons. 
British Empire an n is . . , 'B .t. h citizenship' and 'British fair 
'British civi isat10n ' ' . i · m that 'was imbue I · ' 'British JUst1ce n is d 
B 't' h Canadian ethno-nat10na is 
to express a n is - h ki d of country Canada should f t' ns about w at n 
with a handful o assump 10. h h' h eant among other things, English-be'' according to Nathan Smit ' w ic m ' 
h' r6 
speaking and w ite. aiding Great Britain's war effort, 
Not all North Americans supported d Canada emphasised North 
. · the United States an 
however. Dissenters m . g that the Atlantic served h' d' from Europe argum America's geograp ic istance h '. t from the possibility of an 
as a natural barrier that protected t e contmen 
f debate within the United States over whether 
14 The Lusitania sinking s~t off a fire~tor~o: to travel unmolested into the war zone. 
neutrality gave Americans the ree . . . to define neutrality as a status that 
. d . th Lusitania cns1s b h 'd Wilson's decision urmg e ·1 bl . ht (rather than a pledge to treat ot si es l t' ns unassai a e ng s . guaranteed neutra na IO llision course with Germany. 
equally) ultimately set the United States oWna co mass culture and Canadian cultural 
. , d · dedl The Great ar, ' 
I5 Paul Litt, Cana a mva. . da and the First World War, p. 344. . 
nationalism', in Mackenzie (ed), Cana bl . British country: returned soldiers and 
I6 Nathan Smith, 'Fighting t~e alien pro em6~n ~ ·n James E. Kitchen, Alisa Miller and 
anti-alien activism in wartime CanadaO I:l F l;~t;· Competing Histories of the First World L ra Rowe (eds.), Other Combatants, t er r . ;:r (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2on), p. 305. 
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amphibious German invasion. These isolationists stood ready to defend 
their territorial borders, but found the idea of sending armies outside the 
Western Hemisphere unsettling. Throughout North America, scepticism 
flourished in ethnic and economic communities that had strong political 
reasons for opposing or limiting participation in the war. Isolationist senti-
ment within the United States was particularly strong among German 
Americans and Scandinavians in the Midwest, Irish Americans and the 
rural South. These populations embraced isolationism for a variety of 
reasons: support for relatives in Germany, religious objections, hatred of 
Great Britain and distrust of the eastern financial elite making loans to the 
Allies. Appeals to protect the British Empire failed to sway many French 
Canadians, who worried that wartime mobilisation would accelerate Anglo-
Canadian nation-building. French-Canadian elites pledged support to the 
war, but many others embraced an ethnic-based North American national-
ism that prompted them to resist fighting an overseas war. Concerned that 
the wartime push towards Anglo-conformism threatened their cultural 
autonomy and civil liberties, French Canadians proved reluctant to enlist 
and openly opposed conscription. 
Critics of isolationism countered that it was not the Atlantic Ocean that 
protected North America, but the British navy. Canada and the United States 
benefited tremendously from the blanket of protection that British control 
of the seas offered to its former and present colonies, they argued. Britain 
maintained this naval dominance (with only occasional challenges from 
German U-boats) throughout the war by controlling shipping lanes, block-
ading the North and Baltic Seas through patrols and mines and providing 
ships to transport goods to Europe. Early 1917 was one crucial period when 
Germany threatened to gain the upper hand at sea. In February 1917 Germany 
resumed unconditional submarine warfare, knowing that this decision was 
likely to bring the United States formally into the war. Germany gambled that 
a relentless U-boat assault on shipping would force Britain and France to 
capitulate before the United States could offer much help on the battlefields. 
The sharp increase in German submarine attacks once it resumed uncondi-
tional submarine warfare (reaching a wartime high of 2.2 million tons from 
April-June 1917) left British Admiral John Jellicoe pessimistic over Britain's 
future capacity to wage war. Canadian-born US Admiral William Sims offered 
the solution - instituting a convoy system that relied on US destroyers 
(rather than Britain's slower battleships) to accompany groups of ships cross-
ing the Atlantic. The use of convoys meant that in 1918, for the first time since 
1915, Allied shipbuilding exceeded losses at sea. 'Better than almost any 
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other single factor, the convoy system reveals the truly global nature of World 
War I', writes Michael Neiberg.17 
During the war the United States switched from being a debtor nation, 
dependent on British financing for its industrial development, to a creditor 
nation that did more than lend money to belligerents to fund purchases of 
American goods. When British financiers began liquidating their assets 
throughout the underdeveloped world to fund the war, American bankers 
and industrialists seized on the chance to finance and construct mines, rail-
roads, factories and oil fields throughout the Western Hemisphere. America's 
geographical location vis-a-vis Mexico became a distinct advantage that aided 
its penetration into markets previously dominated by Britain. Accelerating a 
shift already underway, US imports to Mexico rose from 49.7 per cent of all 
imported goods to 66.7 per cent, while the British market share dropped from 
13 per cent to 6.5 per cent from 1913 to 1927.18 Canada underwent a similar shift 
from borrower to lender, the result of credits extended to Britain for pur-
chases of wheat and munitions. 
Yet the war also laid bare the American and Canadian dependence on British 
purchases of its crops and manufactured goods for sustained prosperity -
allowing Britain, at least for the time being, to retain its position as the epicentre 
of the international political economy. The twin effects of 'Britain's multiple 
centrality to the world economy [which] gave her critical leverage in moving 
resources toward the Allies and away from the Central Powers' and 'the United 
States' awesome productive capacity', produced a combination that was difficult 
for Germany and her allies to match, Theo Balderston concludes.19 The out-
come of the war seemingly reinforced Britain's world supremacy, as evidenced 
by its ability to call upon a variety of resources (men, money and material) from 
North America to defeat its European enemies. 
North America's military experience 
Both the United States and Canada entered the war unprepared. In 1914, 
Canada possessed a regular army of just 3,000 with 70,000 in volunteer 
militias. The Canadian Corps would eventually total four divisions, with a 
17 Michael S. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War: A Global History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), p. 292. 
rS Rosemary Thorp, 'Latin America and the international economy from the First World 
War to the world depression', in Leslie Bethell (ed.), The Cambridge History of Latin 
America, vol. vr: 1870-1930 (Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 66. 
19 Theo Balderston, 'Industrial mobilization and war economies', in Horne (ed.), A 
Companion to World War I, p. 229. 
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fifth division broken up to provide replacements. Overall, 619,000 Canadians 
served during the war, with 424,589 serving overseas, out of a population of 
7.5 million people. 20 The situation was not much better within the United 
States <in 1917, when the nation declared war with approximately 300,000 
troops (federal and state) available. Eventually the United States would raise 
a force of 4.4 million, with nearly half of these serving overseas, out of a 
population of 103 million people. 21 Overall, each nation suffered a comparable 
number of casualties, with 66,665 Canadians and 53,402 Americans killed in 
battle. The discrepancy was evident in the proportions that these numbers 
represented, nearly n per cent of the Canadian forces and i.2 per cent of the 
US military. 22 
The United States and Canada raised their forces differently. The United 
States adopted conscription immediately and eventually drafted 72 per cent of 
the armed forces. With this decision the United States broke with its tradition 
of fighting first with volunteers and only using conscription to fill the ranks 
when enlistments lagged. Introducing conscription after the nation suffered 
heavy losses on the battlefield would increase the likelihood of mass protests 
against the draft, American officials reasoned, aware that the nation had been 
sharply divided over entering the war. Canada opted to wait until replacement 
needs became acute, only turning to conscription in 1917 to raise nearly 
100,000 troops. 23 The ability to apply for exemptions helped make the draft 
more politically acceptable within the United States and Canada. The majority 
of draft-eligible Americans and Canadians publicly registered for the draft, and 
then retreated to the privacy of their homes to fill out a form requesting an 
exemption. The pockets of outright opposition to conscription reflected pre-
existing ethnic and regional schisms. Draft resistance occurred primarily in 
American southern rural communities that had opposed entering the war, and 
within French-speaking Quebec, which resisted the government's attempts to 
use wartime military service to underscore Anglo-Canadian dominance. Some 
Quebecois even evaded conscription by fleeing across the border to New 
20 Robert K. Hanks, 'Canada: Army' and James Carroll, Robert K. Hanks and Spencer 
Tucker, 'Canada: Role in war', in Spencer C. Tucker (ed.), World War I: A Student 
Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2005), pp. 257-9. 
21 Jennifer D. Keene, World War I: The American Soldier Experience (Lincoln, NE: University 
of Nebraska, 20u), pp. 33, 163. 
22 Newfoundland was a separate colony during the war, so its disproportionately high 
casualty rate is not included in these figures. The 8,500 men who enlisted in 
Newfoundland represented nearly IO per cent of the adult male population. Of these, 
3,600 were either killed or wounded. 
23 J. L. Granatstein, 'Conscription in the Great War', in Mackenzie (ed.), Canada and the 
First World War, p. 70. 
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England French-Canadian textile communities. This immigrant community 
saw no contradiction between sending its own sons off to fight in the US army 
while simultaneously offering refuge to French-Canadian draft-dodgers.24 
The time it took to raise, transport and train troops from North America 
meant that these armies did not actually enter the front lines until months 
after their respective nations entered the war. Initially both the Americans and 
Canadians fought under the tutelage of the more experienced French and 
British armies. Canada and the United States faced similar pressure to raise 
troops that could be amalgamated into the British and French armies, but 
domestic nationalistic sentiment and concerns about how European generals 
were conducting the war caused each to develop an independent, national 
army instead. 
Unhappiness with the British decision to launch a counter-attack using 
Canadian troops after Germany's first mass gas attack during the Second 
Battle of Ypres ensured 'that the lSt Division became the core of Canada's 
national army rather than an "imperial" formation drawn from a dominion', 
Terry Copp concludes. 25 In April 1917, all four Canadian battalions went into 
action for the first time at the Battle of Arras, when they took Vimy Ridge. 
General Arthur Currie was credited with the victory and in June 1917 given 
command of the Canadian Corps. The Canadians became convinced that they 
were an elite fighting force which could succeed where the British and French 
could not. 'In those few minutes I witnessed the birth of a nation', Brigadier-
General A. E. Ross declared after the war, a notion that has provoked much 
debate ever since. 
Canadians placed tremendous faith in Currie (the first Canadian to attain 
the rank of full general) to use Canadian soldiers effectively and prudently 
while maintaining a certain degree of autonomy on the battlefield. General 
John ]. Pershing, the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces 
(AEF), faced similar expectations within the United States. Seeking to demon-
strate his own leadership abilities on the battlefield, Pershing steadfastly 
re~isted any formal amalgamation of the American army into the Allied 
forces. An independent US army met Wilson's larger political goals as well. 
Pershing sailed to France with clear instructions from the American Secretary 
of War, Newton Baker, 'to cooperate with the forces of the other countries 
employed against the enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be 
24 Christopher Capazzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modem 
American Citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 4L 
25 Terry Copp, 'The military effort, 1914-1918', in Mackenzie (ed.), Canada and the First 
World War, p. 43. 
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kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and 
distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be 
preserved'. 26 Wilson depended on having a strong, visible and independent 
American presence on the battlefield when the Allies won the war. The United 
States needed to play a major role in the fighting, Wilson believed, to 
guarantee him a prominent voice in fashioning the peace, ·which, after all, 
was one of the primary reasons the President had led the nation into war. The 
Americans never gained complete independence (they were always depend-
ent to some degree on Allied logistical assistance), but by the fall of 1918 the 
AEF did occupy its own sector of the Western Front. 
Americans and Canadians claimed that their troops embodied a new brand of 
masculinity born on the frontier, which emphasised aggression, ingenuity and 
individualism. These traits supposedly separated North American soldiers from 
their class-bound, weary European counterparts. In 1917, the Canadian Prime 
Minister, Sir Robert Borden, unsuccessfully proposed that the Canadian 
army take the lead in training the American army, 'because Canadians, like 
Americans, did not have an aristocracy that placed birth over merit'. 27 American 
military training doctrine explicitly underscored the differences in temperament 
between American and European soldiers, identifying individual rifle marks-
manship and 'open warfare' as the hallmarks of the American fighting man. 
'Berlin cannot be taken by the French or the British Armies or by both of them. 
It can only be taken by a thoroughly trained, entirely homogeneous American 
Army', General H. B. Fiske, the head of the American Expeditionary Forces 
training programme, told his colleagues. 28 The preference for rifles over heavy 
artillery remained the bedrock principle of US army doctrine that in Pershing's 
mind defined the American 'way of war'. 
Both the United States and Canada also felt that their military contributions 
and valour went underappreciated by Britain and France. The fear that Britain 
might not adequately document the Canadian war effort led to the creation of 
a Canadian War Records Office that collected materials and publicised 
Canadian military feats to Canadian and English audiences. Likewise an out-
pouring of nationally focused books, articles and films in the United States left 
26 United States Anny in the World War, 1917-1919, 17 vols. (Washington, DC: Center of 
Military History, 2001), vol. r, p. 3. 
27 John English, 'Political leadership in the First World War', in Mackenzie (ed.), Canada 
and the First World War, p. So. Mitchell A. Yokelson, Borrowed Soldiers: Americans under 
British Command, 1918 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), pp. 76-7. 
28 Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War and the Remaking of America (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2001), p. 106. 
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Americans with the dear impression that the United States had practically 
won the war single-handedly. The feeling of being junior partners in a 
European-led coalition no doubt caused some of this chest-thumping. More 
importantly, the political desire of the United States and Canada to parlay their 
wartime participation into greater influence within the new world order also 
necessitated impressing Britain and France with the contribution each nation 
had made to the Allied victory. The exact contributions of American and 
Canadian troops to the overall Allied victory continue to excite debate on both 
sides of the Atlantic to this day. 
The increased importance of the Dominions to the British war effort led 
to the Imperial War Conferences in 1917 and 1918 which gave Dominion 
Prime Ministers or representatives a chance to negotiate how their econo-
mies and armies contributed to the war effort. The Dominions also sent 
their own delegations to the Peace Conference, then signed and ratified the 
peace treaties individually.29 The leading American negotiator, Colonel 
Edward House, welcomed this development, viewing any fracturing within 
the British Empire as positive for the United States. The Canadian Prime 
Minister, Borden, 'deliberately brought the point of view of North America 
to the councils of the empire, a point of view that reflected the growing 
identity of Canadian and American interests', notes Borden's biographer, 
Robert Brown.30 At the Peace Conference Borden experimented with a new 
international role as mediator between the two most powerful English-
speaking world powers. In a manner of speaking, Canada had a foot in 
both camps, and saw itself as uniquely positioned to explain North American 
concerns to Britain and its Dominions and British Empire worries to 
America. Borden intervened several times to fashion compromises when 
American and British delegations clashed on treaty details, arguing espe-
cially forcefully (if futilely) against hefty German reparations to avoid 
antagonising the United States. 'Part of this was self-interest: a reoccurring 
nightmare in Ottawa was that Canada might find itself fighting on the side of 
Britain and its ally Japan against the United States', Margaret MacMillan 
29 Robert Aldrich and Christopher Hillard, 'The French and British Empires', in Horne 
(ed.), A Companion to World War I, p. 532. 
30 Robert Craig Brown, 'Canada in North America', in John Braeman, Robert H. Brenner 
and David Brody (eds.), Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1971), p. 359. See also Robert Craig Brown, "Whither are we being 
shoved?" Political leadership in Canada during World War I', in ]. L. Granatstein and 
R. D. Cuff (eds.), War and Society in North America (Toronto: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1971), 
pp. 104-19. 
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asserts.31 The shared ancestry, language, literature, political institutions and 
beliefs made a potential alliance between the United States and Great Britain 
'sufficient to ensure the peace of the world' if the League of Nations failed 
Borden told Lloyd George.32 This plan never came to pass, but Borden'~ 
sentiments revealed that at the level of high diplomacy, relations between 
Britain and Anglo-North America emerged intact from the war. 
The US and Canada: comparisons and relations 
Comparing the war experiences of the United States and Canada uncovers 
an array of parallels that helped define the North American experience of 
war. These comparable paths underscore similarities in settlement patterns, 
political ideals and economic development. The national identities of the 
United States and Canada traced their political and demographic origins to 
the white-settler Anglo communities that had originally colonised the conti-
nent. This vision of national identity ignored the other demographic realities 
that had peopled North America: slavery, Spanish and French colonisation and 
large-scale immigration by non-Anglo peoples in the early twentieth century. 
Throughout the war, the United States and Canada grappled with organ-
ised protests by marginalised minorities. The ongoing struggle for racial 
equality within the United States sparked racial riots, lynching and wide-
scale state surveillance of African-American political organisations and period-
icals. Over 400,000 African Americans served in the military, with 89 per cent 
placed in non-combatant, labouring roles. 'The attempted exclusion of African 
Americans from a national memory of the war complemented larger attempts 
to marginalize African Americans as citizens from the polity', notes Chad 
Williams.33 The Canadian government's campaign to suppress bilingual 
schools, begun in 1912, stoked fears within Quebec that wartime military 
service would turn into one more vehicle that eliminated French-Canadian 
culture and autonomy. The lagging French-Canadian enlistments (estimated 
by the British War Office as the lowest in the Empire), draft evasion and the 
anti-conscription 1918 Easter riot in Quebec City, all attested to the vibrancy 
of this ethnic conflict. 'A war that many thought could unite French and 
English Canadians had proved everything to the contrary', Patrice A. Dutil 
31 Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York: Random 
House, 2001), pp. 47-8. 
32 Quoted in ibid., p. 48. 
33 Chad L. Williams, Torchbearers of Democracy: African American Soldiers in the World War I 
Era (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 20ro), p. 3or. 
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concludes.34 Rather than breaking down the physical, cultural and political 
separation between the majority and minority populations, the war reinforced 
the isolation of these minority communities. Native peoples served in both the 
American and Canadian armies, an experience that provoked a contradictory 
mix of pressure to assimilate while in uniform and then, once they returned 
home, opportunities to revive traditional warrior ceremonies and traditions. 
The longstanding view of Native Americans as a 'vanishing race' fuelled 
an array of home-front assaults on Native American communities, as govern-
ment agents in the United States and Canada leased indigenous lands to non-
Indians as part of the drive to maximise wartime crop, mineral and livestock 
production. These minority groups thus ended the war with new sets of 
grievances over their poor treatment by the majority culture, amid fresh 
evidence that the federal governments in each nation intended to maintain 
the status quo. 
The transatlantic labour market that linked North America to Europe 
had funnelled nearly 3 million people to Canada from 1896-1914 and over 
8 million Europeans to the United States from 1900-09. Only British subjects 
could enlist in the Canadian army, consequently recruits came predomi-
nantly from the Anglo-British community, both Canadian and British-born. 
The ethnic composition of the military thus reaffirmed the 'British' identity 
of Canada. Besides putting their own German immigrant population under 
surveillance, Canada took concrete steps to protect its borders from the 
large anti-British immigrant populations residing in a neutral United States. 
Canadian fantasies that German spies might somehow entice German-
American or Irish-American communities to conduct guerrilla raids, caused 
Canadian authorities to keep 16,ooo soldiers stationed along the border, part 
of a 50,000-man force that remained at home to repel any direct attack on 
Canadian soil.35 Once the United States entered the war, the need for such 
a strong southern border defence evaporated, allowing Canada to send 
reinforcements to France at a critical moment in the fighting. Within the 
US army, foreign-born soldiers (who had declared their intent to become 
citizens) composed nearly one-fifth of the wartime force, contributions to 
34 Patrice A. Dutil, 'Against isolationism: Napoleon Belcourt, French Canada, and "La 
grande guerre'", in Mackenzie (ed.), Canada and the First World War, p. 125. 
35 Granatstein, 'Conscription', p. 66. According to john Herd Thompson and Stephen 
]. Randall, the US-based German military attache considered such attacks, but the only 
actual case of German sabotage that originated on American soil damaged a railway bridge 
in New Brunswick; john Herd Thompson and Stephen]. Randall, Canada and the United 
States: Ambivalent Allies, 4th edn (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2008), p. 94. 
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the war cause that helped recent immigrants from Allied nations assimilate 
into the mainstream culture. 
Throughout the early twentieth century, native-born and immigrant work-
ers moved freely back and forth across the US-Canadian border, helping 
solidify transnational bonds between labour unions, socialist groups and the 
radical Industrial Workers of the World that caught the attention of intelli-
gence services in both countries. In the post-war period, Canadians and 
Americans accused recently arrived immigrants from southern and central 
Europe of diluting North America's Anglo racial and cultural heritage. These 
immigrants were also charged with importing radical, Bolshevik ideologies 
that threatened capitalism and representative democracy. Protecting North 
America from Bolshevism became a joint US-Canadian endeavour, with the 
two governments sharing information about suspect labour groups through-
out the war and during the post-war Red Scare.36 
Culturally, economically and politically there was little reason for conflict 
between the United States and Canada. Diplomacy helped maintain tranquilli-
ty along the northern border of the United States. By 1914 an embryonic 
bilateral US-Canadian relationship allowed for direct negotiations (albeit with 
British oversight on the Canadian side). In the early twentieth century, several 
international commissions began tackling the traditional causes of conflict 
(settling formal boundaries, access to fisheries and agreed use of shared rivers 
and lakes) between the United States and Canada. These permanent commiss-
ions operated outside the formal diplomatic channels still controlled by 
Britain, and their founding coincided with the closure of the last remaining 
British garrisons in North America in 1906. Canada was now responsible for 
resolving disputes, diplomatic and military, with the United States. The 
temporary appointment of an independent wartime Canadian representative 
within the British Embassy in Washington, DC, made Canada the only British 
Dominion that had the ability to talk directly to the US government. These 
developments paved the way for wartime cooperation and the eventual 
establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1927.37 
Cultural connections reinforced these growing diplomatic ties. A steady 
stream of US-produced movies, magazines, newspapers, books, advertise-
ments and music poured into Canada. The sheer number of products created 
for the much larger American audience and the efficient railroad distribution 
36 Donald Avery, 'Ethnic and class relations in Western Canada during the First World 
War: a case study of European immigrants and Anglo-Canadian nativism', in Mackenzie 
(ed.), Canada and the First World War, pp. 286-7. 
37 Thompson and Randall, Canada and the United States, pp. 71-9, 96-7. 
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networks that transported them throughout Anglo-North America, made it 
difficult for distinctly Canadian cultural offerings to thrive. American touring 
companies regularly included Canadian cities and towns on their itineraries, 
exposing Canadians to a full range of American circuses, vaudeville shows, 
minstrel acts and Wild West shows. These facts dismayed the Canadian 
cultural elite, but the general public avidly consumed American movies and 
music with little debate or reflection before the war. The influx of British 
imports also hampered the development of Canadian cultural traditions, as 
many middle- and upper-class Canadians actively sought to maintain and 
cultivate this cultural connection to mother England. 
The war, however, temporarily disrupted this benign cultural relationship 
between Canada and the United States. The first fissures appeared when Canada 
entered the war and the United States remained neutral. Wartime Canada 
avidly consumed Canadian-authored books explaining the war, along with 
British films like the Battle of the Somme (1916). 'Had American mass culture 
been merely inadequate, perhaps such [British] import substitutes would have 
seen Canadians happily through the war years', notes Paul Litt. 'But in fact, 
American cultural products were not merely lacking - they were offensive.'38 
Heightened Canadian patriotism, along with pride in fighting as part of the 
British Empire, suddenly made Canadians aware of how much flag-waving 
and jingoism permeated US-produced films, songs, books and plays. Canadians 
chafed at the tone of moral superiority that America adopted as a neutral 
nation, well aware of the profits flowing into US coffers from the healthy 
munitions trade. French-Canadian Senator Napoleon Belcourt aptly summar-
ised Canadian views towards US neutrality: 'mere money making is after all but 
a very poor, indeed a very miserable compensation for the loss of national 
prestige, national honor, caused by neglecting or ignoring modern solidarity, 
the solidarity of civilized mankind'.39 America's entry into the war helped ease 
these cultural tensions, but 'during the 1920s and 1930s, no Canadian forgot that 
Canada, with one-tenth the population, had more killed and wounded than the 
United States', noted historians John Herd Thompson and Stephen]. Randall.40 
Conflict between Mexico and the United States 
In 1916 it appeared more likely that the United States would go to war with 
Mexico than enter the Great War. Mexican politics had been in upheaval since 
38 Litt, 'Canada invaded!', p. 338. 39 Quoted in Dutil, 'Against isolationism', p. 122. 
40 Thompson and Randall, Canada and the United States, p. 98. 
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the Mexican Revolution began in l9IO. The United States played a direct role 
in the revolution, temporarily intervening in 1914 with a landing in Veracruz 
that helped bring a new leader, Venustiano Carranza, to power. As Carranza 
fell out of favour with the Americans, his supporters hatched the Plan of San 
Diego, which called for a series of raids into US border towns to kill all the 
Anglo-Americans living there and incite an uprising among the remaining 
Mexican-Americans and blacks. 41 A Mexican invasion was to follow to estab-
lish Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado and California as independent 
republics that could opt to join Mexico. The plan fell apart when the US 
government got wind of it. An increased troop presence along the border 
dealt effectively with the few guerrilla raids attempted in 1915. On 9 March 
1916, however, the anti-Carranza Mexican revolutionary, General Francisco 
'Pancho' Villa, attacked Columbus, New Mexico with a force of 500, killing 
eighteen Americans. Villa intended to provoke the United States into 
invading Mexico, hoping to weaken Carranza' s constitutional government 
by exposing its inability to prevent a US violation of Mexican national 
sovereignty. German operatives in Mexico helped finance these rebel activi-
ties, expecting a border war to distract the United States from the European 
conflict. 
As Villa (and Germany) anticipated, Wilson answered this first attack on 
American soil since the War of 1812 by sending a 14,000-man expeditionary 
force into Mexico without Carranza' s permission or approval. Another 
140,000 National Guardsmen (state-controlled militias mobilised into active 
federal service) and regular army troops patrolled the border. 42 'The deeper 
the expedition penetrated, the more Mexicans suspected that the dreaded 
Yanquis were bent on conquest', John Milton Cooper, Jr. notes. These suspi-
cions led to a series of clashes between US troops and governmental forces, 
including a firefight in Carrizal on 21 June 1916. 43 In the wake of this clash 
Wilson prepared a request for congressional authority to occupy northern 
Mexico, which he subsequently abandoned upon learning that American 
soldiers had fired first. This was the closest the two countries had come to 
war since the Mexican-American War oh846-8. 
In contrast to American reluctance to enter the European war, Wilson faced 
strong ,pressure from some cabinet officials and Congress to go to war with 
41 James A. Sandos, Rebellion in the Borderlands: Anarchism and the Plan of San Diego, 1904-
1923 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992). 
42 War Department, Annual Reports 1916, 3 vols. (US Government Printing Office, 1916), 
vol. r, pp. 13, 23, 189-9r. 
43 Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, p. 320. 
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Mexico in 1916. Realising that formal hostilities would lead to a lengthy war, 
Wilson and Carranza agreed instead to appoint a mediation commission that 
paved the way for the withdrawal of US troops on 5 February 1917. In 1916, 
Wilson ran for re-election with the campaign slogan, 'He kept us out of war.' 
Most historians equate the phrase with Wilson's handling of the Lusitania 
crisis, but Democrats campaigning for Wilson gave equal weight to Mexico 
during their stump speeches.44 Wilson offered many reasons for wanting to 
avoid a border war, including suspicions that those pushing for armed inter-
vention really wanted improved access to Mexican oil, which British and 
American business interests had long vied to control. Wilson also knew that 
having half a million troops bogged down in Mexico would severely hamper 
the creation of an American expeditionary force if the United States went to 
war with Germany. 'Germany is anxious to have us at war with Mexico, so 
that our minds and our energies will be taken off the great war across the sea', 
Wilson told his personal secretary.45 
The Mexican punitive expedition failed in its stated goal of capturing Villa, 
but 'its real purpose was a display of the power of the United States', Secretary 
of War Newton Baker asserted. 46 The US military, under-strength and under-
equipped in comparison to the European armies fighting along the Western 
Front, gained important experience fighting its first sustained campaign since 
the 1898 Spanish-American War. The invasion's commander, Brigadier 
General John J. Pershing, would go on to lead the wartime army, carrying 
the lessons learned from Mexico to France. The incursion gave the army its 
first test mobilising National Guard troops and readying them for combat, 
along with practice mounting the surveillance and logistics needed to main-
tain an army on the move. None of this went particularly well or smoothly in 
Mexico, a harbinger of the challenges ahead. These problems helped prepared-
ness advocates win some funding to enlarge, reorganise and modernise the 
nation's military in the days leading up to America's entry into the First World 
War. Those determined to avoid any involvement in the European war had 
steadfastly opposed preparedness as one step removed from intervention. The 
armed clash with Mexico, however, allowed the preparedness faction to 
argue that the nation needed a stronger military to protect its borders.47 
44 Ibid., p. 322. 
45 N. G. Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 3n. 
46 War Department, Annual Reports, 1917, 3 vols. (US Government Printing Office, 1917), 
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The National Defense Act of 1916 increased the size of the peacetime army and 
federal supervision of state troops, and laid the groundwork for federal 
mobilisation of the economy - measures designed with the European war in 
mind. Visions of men going into battle without enough machine guns or 
flying airplanes that routinely crashed (as in Mexico), prompted Congress to 
appropriate more money for both. 
Viewing the Zimmermann Telegram within the context of Mexican rebel 
border raids, the San Diego plan and armed clashes between US and Mexican 
troops, helps illuminate Germany's decision to send the telegram, and the 
subsequent US outrage. The Zimmermann Telegram proposed that Mexico 
ally with Germany to recoup territory lost in the mid nineteenth century, if 
Germany and the United States went to war. 'Mexico's hatred for America is 
well-founded and old', German Foreign Minister, Arthur Zimmermann, assured 
his German colleagues, citing the American military' s recent poor performance 
chasing Villa to predict a long, drawn-out war between Mexico and the United 
States that would keep American troops tied down in North America.48 
Zimmermann's enthusiastic endorsement of this proposed German-Mexican 
alliance represented a complete change of heart. Only a year earlier he had 
rejected Mexico's offer to house German U-boat bases to avoid a rupture in 
US-German relations. In January 1917, however, Zimmermann believed that 
the German decision to resume unconditional submarine warfare would be 
likely to bring the United States into the war. By sending the secret telegram, 
Zimmermann inadvertently played a major role in ensuring American belliger-
ency once the British intercepted, decoded and then passed the telegram on to 
the American government. The telegram's publication in March 1917 unified a 
previously divided America~ public in favour of war with Germany. 'The note 
had its greatest impact in precisely those areas of the United States where 
isolationism and thus opposition to U.S. involvement in the war were particu-
larly strong: the Southwest', writes Friedrich Katz; border states where the 
recent troubles with Mexico loomed the largest.49 
The aftershocks of the Zimmermann Telegram went beyond prompting 
US entry into the war. Within North America the note threatened further 
damage to US-Mexican relations, as Carranza hedged on his response. 
Publicly denying that he had ever received the telegram, Carranza privately 
contemplated the likelihood of another American invasion, what kind of 
48 Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States and the Mexican 
Revolution (University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 35r. 
49 Ibid., p. 36r. 
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military aid Germany could reasonably give and his advisers' assessment that 
the proposal was unworkable. On 14 April 1917, eight days after the United 
States declared war on Germany, Carranza told the German ambassador to 
Mexico that he intended to remain neutral. 
As Wilson wanted, Mexico adopted a new constitution in 1917 that allowed 
for universal suffrage and land reform. But Carranza also moved to reassert 
national control over Mexican natural resources, especially oil and minerals. His 
government imposed higher taxes, required landowners to get official approval 
before selling land to foreigners and added a constitution clause that conferred 
ownership of all underground resources to the nation rather than the land-
owner. These measures had little immediate effect. The Mexican government 
made no effort to enforce this constitutional clause, and foreign warships 
ensured that oil fields along the Gulf coast continued to produce record amounts 
of oil for the Allied war effort. Reports that the Americans were seriously 
considering a limited occupation of Mexican oil fields, the ban on American 
loans to Mexico and a US embargo on arms, food and gold, however, prompted 
Carranza to continue ongoing, if fruitless, conversations with German officials 
for the rest of the war about a possible alliance. In the spring of 1919, the 
possibility of war between the United States and Mexico loomed once again. 
American oil interests and some members of Wilson's administration began 
plotting a coup with Carranza' s opponents, all the while pressuring Wilson to 
break diplomatic relations. Coinciding with the incapacitating stroke that ren-
dered Wilson bed-ridden for months, these plans went nowhere. The drumbeat 
of criticism in the press and Congress nonetheless strained relations with 
Carranza until his eventual overthrow by the military in the spring of 1920.50 
The North American origins of Wilsonianism 
The United States had long seen the Monroe Doctrine (an 1823 pronounce-
ment by President James Monroe that the Western Hemisphere was off-limits 
to future colonisation by other world powers) as a commitment to guarantee 
the sovereignty of newly independent nations throughout the Western 
Hemisphere. Wilson's predecessors had already enlarged the scope of the 
Monroe Doctrine to include the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary (which justified US 
regional policing to prevent 'wrongdoing') and strengthen the US regional 
economic presence through dollar diplomacy. Wilson now attempted to apply 
50 Mark T. Gilderhus, Pan American Visions: Woodrow Wilson in the Western Hemisphere, 
1913-1921 (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1986), pp. 147-9, 152-3. 
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the principles of the Monroe Doctrine globally. The wording of Wilson's 
famous 'Peace without Victory' speech of 1917, which proposed a negotiated 
settlement to the world war, explicitly presented the American experience in 
the Western Hemisphere as a model for future international relations. 'I am 
proposing ... ', Wilson stated, 'that the nations should with one accord adopt 
the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation 
should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every 
people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of 
development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the 
powerful.' 
Wilson's willingness to intervene militarily to make Mexico and the 
Caribbean 'safe for democracy' served as a 'rehearsal for preparing the nation 
for the grand task of global reconstruction' that Wilson would attempt once 
the United States entered the world war, Akira Iriye argues.51 Many of the 
ideals that Wilson would go on to trumpet through his 1918 Fourteen Points 
address and at the Versailles peace negotiations, he initially proposed to 
improve US relations with its southern neighbour. Hoping to teach 
Mexicans 'to elect good men', Wilson floated a proposal for a Pan-American 
Pact that would allow the United States to work in concert with Argentina, 
Chile and Brazil to promote democracy, settle disputes and guarantee 
borders within the Western Hemisphere. 'Although nothing came of the 
Pan-American pact, its provisions contained language and ideas that Wilson 
would use in the Covenant of the League of Nations', Cooper notes.52 The 
limits that Wilson imposed on regional interventions and his attempt to devise 
a method of collective security to handle disputes within the Western 
Hemisphere revealed that, 'in the Wilsonian way of war, the limits of force 
were equal in importance to the power of force', asserts Frederick 
S. Calhoun.53 
Wilson ultimately failed to convince isolationists within the United States 
(who clung to the Monroe Doctrine as a way to limit US involvement in world 
affairs) that the time had come for active participation in the League 
of Nations. His opponents argued that joining the League of Nations would 
threaten US regional dominance and embroil the nation in 'entangling allia-
nces' that would lead to involvement in future European wars. The desire to 
51 Akira Iriye, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, vol. m: The Globalizing of 
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52 Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, p. 246. 
53 Frederick S. Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy 
(Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1986), p. 25r. 
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define its own foreign policy unilaterally and to continue relying on North 
America's physical distance from Europe to maintain diplomatic and political 
independence, ultimately prevailed over Wilson's suggestion that the United 
States take on more formal responsibility as the world's guardian of democ-
racy and humanity. Participation in the world war thus only reaffirmed 
America's view of itself as a North American nation. 
Conclusion 
The war noticeably amplified American influence within the Western 
Hemisphere and the increased integration of North American economies 
and politics. The trend towards regional integration under the leadership of 
the United States did not go unchallenged. In 1919, Mexican President 
Carranza vocally disputed Wilson's claim that the Monroe Doctrine bene-
fited nations seeking to determine their own futures. Instead, he assailed 
the policy as extending the imperial reach of the United States within the 
Western Hemisphere by imposing 'upon independent nations a pro-
tectorate status which they do not ask for and which they do not require' .54 
Carranza instead proposed pan-Hispanic cooperation to curb US hegemony in 
the region, foreshadowing future ideological disputes over whether America 
was a 'good neighbour' or 'imperialist' in the Western Hemisphere. Carranza 
unsuccessfully urged smaller and weaker Central American nations to join 
together to prevent the United States from intervening unilaterally in their 
domestic affairs. He had better luck fostering a strong sense of Mexican 
nationalism built upon a legacy of wartime tension with the United States. 
Canada's embrace of imperial nationhood revealed its commitment to evolve 
as a nation within, rather than in opposition to, the British Empire. The centrali-
ty of the memory of the First World War within Canada helped reinforce its 
sense of solidarity with other Dominions whose national identities became 
inextricably linked to their battlefield experiences. No sense of shared wartime 
sacrifice bound the United States and Canada together in the post-war period. 
Instead, the memory of the war took quite different trajectories on each side of 
the border. The decentralised way in which American communities commemo-
rated the war prevented any unifying collective memory of the war from taking 
root. The absence of a national monument to the war in Washington, DC, 
stands in notable contrast to the dominating presence of the Peace Tower and 
54 Gilderhus, Pan American Visions, p. 146. 
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the National War Memorial in Ottawa. These sites of memory strengthened 
Canada's cultural identification with the British Empire, a relationship which 
bestowed economic benefits as well. The 1932 Ottawa Conference, for instance, 
established a five-year privileged trading relationship among Britain and its 
Dominions at the height of the Great Depression (much to America's irritation). 
Overall, however, the war accelerated the coordination of the American 
and Canadian diplomatic goals and domestic policies, strengthening bilat-
eral relations between the two nations. To the south, the war unsettled 
US-Mexican relations, ultimately prompting the United States to use force 
to assert its economic, political and military dominance. Whether the 
process was rocky as in the case of US-Mexican relations or relatively 
smooth as between the United States and Canada, the economic and 
political integration of North America was one of the key global legacies 
of the First World War. 
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